Civil Procedure by Colleluori, Donald et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 58






Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






HE major developments in the field of civil procedure during the
Survey period occurred through judicial decisions.
I. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
The Texas Supreme Court issued several opinions addressing jurisdic-
tional issues during the Survey period. In Texas Department of Parks and
Wildlife v. Miranda,1 the supreme court noted that the court of appeals
misstated and misapplied the holding in Bland Independent School Dis-
trict v. Blue2 that "a trial court 'may consider evidence and must do so
when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised." 3 The Miranda
plaintiffs sued for personal injury suffered at a state park. "Due to the
unusual confluence of standards ... for waiver of sovereign immunity"
set out in the Texas Tort Claims Act and recreational use statute, the
supreme court held the plaintiffs were required to plead and, if their
pleading was challenged, offer proof that the Department of Parks and
Wildlife was grossly negligent in order to establish that the district court
had subject matter jurisdiction.4 Recognizing that this same proof would
also go to the merits of plaintiffs' claim, the supreme court adopted a
standard that mirrors summary judgment practice and requires only that
the plaintiff introduce evidence sufficient to raise a fact issue on the juris-
dictional question in order to defeat a plea to the jurisdiction.5 In re-
sponse to dissenting Justice Jefferson's concern that this rule could
deprive plaintiffs of the procedural protections attendant to summary
judgment motions, such as twenty-one days notice of any hearing and
* B.A., Dickinson College; J.D., New York University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
port, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S. University of Colorado; J.D., Boston University. Partner, Figari & Daven-
port, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
*** B.B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Partner, Figari
& Davenport, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004).
2. 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000).
3. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 223 (quoting Bland, 34 S.W.3d at 555); see also Gene Duke
Builders, Inc. v. Abilene Hous. Auth., 138 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. 2004) (holding that trial court
must, upon request, enter findings of fact and conclusions of law when evidence is received
on plea to jurisdiction).
4. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 221.
5. Id. at 227-28.
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time for discovery, the majority stated that matters such as the timing of
the hearing and amount of discovery permitted should be left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.6 Similarly, the supreme court rejected
the suggestion in a second dissent by Justice Brister that any plea of im-
munity should be required to take the form of "two 'standard' or 'estab-
lished' motions-either special exceptions or motions for summaryjudgment."'7 The majority explained that the plea to the jurisdiction has
been used in Texas for over 150 years, and a refinement of the rules for
considering such a plea is a better solution than abolishing the plea in its
entirety. 8
In Harris County v. Sykes,9 the Texas Supreme Court held that when a
governmental entity successfully files a plea to the jurisdiction, the result-
ing dismissal should be with prejudice because it fully and finally adjudi-
cates whether the claims asserted come within the Texas Tort Claims
Act's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The supreme court noted
that where a plaintiff is capable of remedying a jurisdictional defect, "a
dismissal with prejudice would be improper." 10 The supreme court held,
however, that if the plaintiff does not establish a waiver of immunity,
after having been given a reasonable opportunity to amend his pleadings
to meet a plea to the jurisdiction, he should not be permitted to relitigate
the issue in a second action.1 Echoing his dissent in Miranda, Justice
Brister viewed Sykes as another reason why the defense of governmental
immunity ought not to be raised by "a motion called a 'plea to the juris-
diction."' 1 2 In this regard, his concurring opinion noted that the supreme
court in recent years held that "the dismissal must be without prejudice
when the plea to the jurisdiction is based on mootness, forum non con-
veniens, or exclusive jurisdiction. '1 3
The Texas Tort Claims Act requires a claimant to give the governmen-
tal entity notice of his claim within six months of the date of the inci-
dent.14 University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center at Dallas v.
Loutzenhiser15 examined the question whether this notice requirement isjurisdictional.16 Resolving a split among the courts of appeals, the Texas
Supreme Court held that the failure to give the required notice does not
deprive the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction over an action on the
claim. 17 The supreme court noted that where courts in other states have
construed such notice provisions as jurisdictional, the statutory language
6. Id. at 228-29.
7. Id. at 232.
8. Id.
9. 136 S.W.3d 635, 637 (Tex. 2004).
10. Id. at 639.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 641 (Brister, J., concurring).
13. Id. (internal citations omitted).
14. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1997).
15. 140 S.W.3d 351, 362 (Tex. 2004).
16. Id. at 366.
17. Id. at 362.
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was much clearer than that in the Texas Tort Claims Act.1 8 The supreme
court emphasized, however, that the requirement of notice is no less
mandatory in Texas, and the failure to provide such notice, while not ju-
risdictional, will bar the action.19
While sovereign immunity may protect a governmental entity from
suit, the governmental entity may waive that protection by its litigation
conduct. Thus, in Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas, the Texas
Supreme Court held that by intervening in a pending lawsuit to assert its
own claims for affirmative relief, the City of Dallas waived its immunity,
and the trial court therefore had subject matter jurisdiction over the ad-
verse party's claims against the city.20 Similarly, in Ray Ferguson Inter-
ests, Inc. v. Harris County Sports & Convention Corp., the local
government corporation waived its immunity from suit on the adverse
party's claims by filing its own counterclaim for affirmative relief.
2 1
The jurisdiction of Texas courts to enter orders having extraterritorial
effect was the subject of two cases decided during the Survey period. In
Greenpeace, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,22 the oil company obtained in-
junctive relief against the activist group that was aimed specifically at a
protest planned for the company's headquarters in Irving, Texas. The
form of the temporary injunction, however, also prohibited Greenpeace
from breaking into or trespassing on any Exxon Mobil property any-
where within the United States. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that
the trial court had jurisdiction to enter such an injunction since it oper-
ated in personam against Greenpeace and did not involve issues of title
or local real estate law applicable to property located in other states.
23
Similarly, in McDowell v. McDowell, the trial court had in personam ju-
risdiction over the parties, and the central issue in the case was not who
had title to real property located in Florida, but whether a partnership
existed between the parties and, if so, on what terms.24 Thus, the San
Antonio Court of Appeals had subject matter jurisdiction over the case,
including jurisdiction to order one partner to pay the other half of the
profits from the sale of the Florida realty.
25
In Lacy v. Bassett,26 the plaintiff sought inspection of the financial
records of his church under the non-profit corporation act. The defen-
dant argued that the "ecclesiastical doctrine," which forbids civil courts
18. Id. at 362-65 n.53 (surveying case law from various states).
19. Id. at 365.
20. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 47 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 408, 410 (Tex. April 2,
2004).
21. Ray Ferguson Interests, Inc. v. Harris County Sports & Convention Corp., No. 01-
04-00568-CV, 2004 WL 2250930, at *5-6 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 7, 2004, no
pet. h.).
22. 133 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
23. Id. at 809-10.
24. McDowell v. McDowell, 143 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet.
denied).
25. Id.
26. 132 S.W.3d 119 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
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from inquiring into religious doctrine or beliefs in order to resolve dis-
putes over church property, polity, or administration, deprived the trial
court of jurisdiction. 27 Notwithstanding this doctrine, the Houston Court
of Appeals stated that churches and their congregations are amenable to
the rules governing civil, contract, and property rights, and a court may
interpret church documents in purely secular terms without relying on
religious precepts to resolve conflicts that have been brought before the
court.28 Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the case for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, because that plaintiff's claim would require the
court only to interpret a neutral principle of law and not to involve itself
in any religious doctrine or principles.29
II. SERVICE OF PROCESS
The sufficiency of a certificate of service from the Secretary of State to
support a default judgment was at issue in Campus Investments, Inc. v.
Cullever.30 After several unsuccessful attempts to serve the corporate de-
fendant at its registered address, the plaintiffs requested service on the
Secretary of State pursuant to the Business Corporation Act. 31 The Sec-
retary of State issued a certificate that he had received and forwarded the
citation and petition by certified mail, which was returned marked "At-
tempted-Not Known." After this certificate but no citation or return
had been on file more than ten days, the plaintiffs obtained a default
judgment, which the court of appeals upheld. Resolving a conflict among
the appellate courts, the Texas Supreme Court held that the Secretary of
State's certificate conclusively established that process was served and
dispensed with the requirement in Rule 10732 that the citation and proof
of service be on file for ten days before a default judgment can be en-
tered.33 The supreme court recognized that "service of a defective cita-
tion through substituted service on the Secretary of State could mislead a
defendant and lead to the entry of an improper default judgment. ' 34 The
remedy in that case, however, is that the defendant may bring a bill of
review and establish those facts. 35
27. Id. at 122.
28. Id. at 123.
29. Id. at 126.
30. 144 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. 2004).
31. Id.
32. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
33. Id.; Campus, 144 S.W.3d at 465-66.
34. Campus, 144 S.W.3d at 466.
35. Id. The court found the defendant was not misled in Campus, and that it was
negligent in failing to update the addresses for its registered agent and registered office.Id. Presumably, the Texas courts will be more sympathetic to a bill of review brought by a
defendant who was served through the Secretary of State, but who was not statutorily
required to have its current address on file with the Secretary of State. See, e.g., TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044(b) (Vernon 1997) (authorizing substituted service on
Secretary of State for a non-resident who does business in Texas but does not maintain a
regular place of business or registered agent in the State).
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As most practitioners are aware, a plaintiff who files suit within the
limitations period but does not serve the defendant with process until
after limitations has run must have exercised diligence in effecting ser-
vice, or his claim will be time-barred.36 Ramirez v. Consolidated HGM
Corp. applied this rule in a rather unusual factual setting.37 In Ramirez,
suit was filed and service of citation attempted by certified mail within
the statute of limitations, but the return receipt was signed by someone
other than the party to whom it was addressed. Several years passed,
however, before a motion to quash was filed, and then several more years
passed before the motion was heard. The trial court stated at the hearing
that it intended to grant the motion, but no order to that effect was en-
tered for over another year. In the meantime, the defendant filed its an-
swer.38 The defendant then successfully moved for summary judgment
on limitations grounds.
39
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment.
40
The court first held that the order quashing service was proper, because
the wrong person signed the return receipt.41 The court rejected the ar-
gument that this defect was waived by the defendant's filing of an answer
before the trial court ruled on its motion to quash.42 The court reasoned
that while the filing of an answer dispenses with the need for issuance and
service of citation and normally waives any complaints regarding service,
it does not waive defects in service that are raised for the purpose of
showing that the limitations period has expired. 43 The court went on to
hold that, given the passage of time with little or no activity on their part,
the plaintiffs had not, as a matter of law, used diligence in attempting to
perfect service on defendant.
44
III. SPECIAL APPEARANCE
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of waiver of a special
appearance in Exito Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Trejo.45 The Taiwanese man-
ufacturer in this product case entered into and filed a Rule 1146 agree-
ment extending its time to file a responsive pleading before filing its
special appearance. The court of appeals held that this violated the due-
order-of-pleading rule and waived the manufacturer's special appear-
36. See, e.g., Tranter v. Duemling, 129 S.W.3d 257, 259-61 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004,
no pet.) (holding that plaintiff raised a fact issue regarding his diligence in serving defen-
dant despite total elapsed time of three months between filing and service).
37. Ramirez v. Consol. HGM Corp., 124 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004,
no pet. h.).
38. Id. at 916-17.
39. Id. at 916.
40. Id. at 915.
41. Id. at 916.
42. Id. at 916-18.
43. Id. at 917.
44. Id. at 919.
45. 142 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. 2004).
46. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11 (requiring agreements relating to pending suit to be in writing,
signed and filed of record to be enforceable).
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ance. 47 The supreme court disagreed, holding that a Rule 11 agreement
that merely extends the time for the defendant's initial pleading, even
when filed before a special appearance and not expressly made subject to
same, "does not violate Rule 120a's 'due-order-of-pleading' requirement
and thus does not constitute a general appearance. '48 The supreme court
also held that the manufacturer did not waive its special appearance byparticipating in motion practice with respect to discovery related to the
special appearance. 49 Since Rule 120a 50 expressly allows a specially ap-
pearing defendant to participate in jurisdictional discovery without risk of
waiver of its special appearance, the supreme court reasoned it would beillogical to prohibit it from seeking the trial court's ruling on disputes that
may arise regarding such discovery.51
Waiver was also the issue in several intermediate appellate decisions
during the Survey period. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held in HMS
Aviation v. Layale Enterprises, S.A., that a motion to increase the plain-
tiff's sequestration bond did not waive the defendant's special appear-
ance, where the motion was made subject to the special appearance and
was not heard prior to the special appearance being heard or deter-
mined.52 In Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., the San Antonio Court of
Appeals rejected an argument of waiver based on the attorney for the
specially appearing defendant participating in a hearing on a motion for
entry of a default judgment against several other defendants. 53 The court
based its decision on two factors. First, the default judgment was sought
as a sanction for discovery abuse and therefore related to discovery in
which the defendant was entitled to participate.54 Second, the defendantdid not request affirmative relief inconsistent with his contention that the
court lacked jurisdiction over him.55
Nguyen v. Desai addressed the proper form of an order granting a spe-
cial appearance. 56 The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals held that a
47. Exito, 142 S.W.3d at 304.
48. Id. at 306; see also Crystalix Group Int'l v. Vitro Laser Group USA, Inc., 127S.W.3d 425, 428 n.2 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (holding that Rule 11 agreement
extending a temporary restraining order did not waive special appearance, but declining to
establish a bright-line rule for all Rule 11 agreements).
49. Exito, 142 S.W.3d at 306.
50. TEx R. Civ. P. 120(a)(1) (taking of depositions and use of discovery processes
shall not constitute waiver of special appearance).
51. Exito, 142 S.W.3d at 306-07. Finally, the supreme court also held that defects inthe special appearance's verification and supporting affidavit did not give rise to a waiver.
Id. at 307-08.
52. HMS Aviation v. Layale Enters., S.A., 149 S.W.3d 182,190 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth
2004, no pet. h.).53. Carone v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, pet. denied).
54. Id.55. Id. But see Seals v. Upper Trinity Reg'l Water Dist., 145 S.W.3d 291, 298 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed) (holding that party's appearance at a status conference,
without contesting personal jurisdiction at or before that time, constituted a general
appearance).




dismissal with prejudice to refiling in Texas was error.57 Although an or-
der dismissing claims for lack of personal jurisdiction should preclude re-
litigation of the jurisdictional issues actually decided, the court held that
it should not preclude a second action in Texas if the plaintiff "can estab-
lish personal jurisdiction based upon issues that were not decided in the
first action."'58 For example, the court hypothesized, if the defendants
were to become residents of Texas after the first case was dismissed, they
would be subject to the Texas courts' general jurisdiction, and the dismis-
sal of the first case on special appearance should not then preclude the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over them in the second action.
59
IV. VENUE
When a trial court transfers venue for the "convenience of the parties,"
the court's ruling cannot be appealed or reviewed by mandamus and can-
not constitute reversible error.60 In Garza v. Garcia, the Texas Supreme
Court reversed a court of appeal's decision that refused to presume a
venue order was granted on convenience grounds unless the order specif-
ically so stated.61 In particular, the defendant moved to transfer on the
grounds that Starr County was not a county of proper venue and, "alter-
natively, [that] venue should be transferred to Hidalgo County for the
convenience of the parties."'62 The trial court granted the defendant's
motion to transfer venue but did not state the reasons for its decision.
63
On appeal, the plaintiff sought reversal and a new trial based on the
venue-transfer order.64 "The court of appeals reversed, refusing to pre-
sume the venue order was granted on convenience grounds" because it
did not specifically so state.65 Although the court of appeals' decision
was contrary to the traditional presumption applicable to other orders, it
"refused to imply a finding on convenience grounds, because the statu-
tory prohibition on appellate review precluded reviewing the record for
evidence that might support such an implied finding."'66 The court of ap-
peals' primary "concern was that the usual presumption in favor of non-
specific orders will make many venue orders immune from review."
67
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the transfer
order did not include the reasons for the decision, the supreme court
could not "ignore the legislature's ban on reviewing such orders by adopt-
57. Id. at 119.
58. Id. at 118.
59. Id. at 118-19.
60. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b), (c) (Vernon 2002).
61. Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36 (Tex. 2004).
62. Id. at 38.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (Vernon 2002) ("if venue
was improper it shall in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error").
65. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 39.
66. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §15.064(a) (Vernon 2002) ("the court
shall determine venue questions from the pleadings and affidavits").
67. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 38-39.
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ing a new presumption" that would allow them to be reviewed anyway. 68
Although the supreme court acknowledged that in many cases transfer
orders would therefore be immune from review, the supreme court recog-
nized that with respect to orders based on convenience of the parties, that
appears to have been precisely what the legislature intended. 69
In In re AIU Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court considered
whether a defendant had waived its reliance on a forum selection
clause.70 The forum selection clause at issue required that any litigation,
arbitration, or other form of dispute resolution take place in New York.
The plaintiff argued that the defendant waived its right to seek enforce-
ment of the forum selection clause because it did not file its motion to
dismiss until five months after the suit was filed, and after the defendant
had already requested a jury trial, paid the jury fee, and filed a general
denial instead of a special appearance. The supreme court held that none
of these activities constituted waiver of the forum selection clause. 71
Moreover, the supreme court specifically held that the defendant was not
required to file a special appearance, as it did not challenge personal ju-
risdiction but sought only to enforce its contractual right to have the mat-
ter determined in a specified location. 72
In Carlisle v. RLS Legal Solutions, Inc. ,73 the Fourteenth District Court
of Appeals considered whether a defendant waived his venue argument.
RLS, the plaintiff below, filed its original petition against Carlisle in No-
vember 2000. Carlisle filed his motion to transfer venue in January 2001.
Before the motion to transfer was heard or decided, RLS filed its motion
for summary judgment, which the court granted on June 26, 2001. On
July 25, 2001, Carlisle filed a motion for a new trial.
Carlisle began the motion for new trial by arguing that he attempted to
file a response to the summary judgment motion, entitled "Defendant's
Motion for Continuance, Motion to Set a Hearing to Transfer Venue,
Special Exceptions and Objections to the Plaintiff's Offer of Proof as to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to the Motion
for Summary Judgment." Carlisle claimed that "the county clerk [had]
mistakenly refused to file his response and, instead, returned it.''74 Fol-
lowing this initial paragraph, Carlisle's motion for new trial focused solely
on his argument that the court should vacate the order granting summaryjudgment, without any argument in support of his venue motion.
Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals found that Carlisle waived
his venue argument.75 In particular, the court held that "by filing a mo-
tion for new trial when the venue motion was pending, the defendant
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004).
71. Id. at 120-21.
72. Id. at 121.
73. 138 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
74. Id. at 406.
75. Id. at 411.
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engaged in 'an act seeking to invoke the authority of the court whose
authority' he challenged. 1' 6 The court of appeals found that "because
Carlisle's motion for new trial was a pleading that addressed the merits of
the summary judgment before Carlisle pursued a ruling on his venue mo-
tion, the motion for new trial could be construed as an 'affirmative action'
by which he submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court."' 77 Finally, the
court also noted that "a party filing a venue motion has the burden to
diligently request a setting on the motion and obtain a ruling prior to a
trial on the merits."' 78 In this case, the delay in obtaining a hearing also
provided a basis to deny the motion to transfer.
79
In Bench Co. v. Nations Rent of Texas, L.P., the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals also addressed whether a defendant had waived its venue argu-
ment.80 In this case, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on
March 7, 2003 that was set for hearing on April 11, 2003. The defendant
did not respond to the motion for summary judgment but on March 28,
2003 requested a hearing on its previously-filed motion to transfer venue.
Pursuant to Rule 87, the plaintiff was entitled to forty-five days notice of
the hearing on the motion to transfer venue.81 Accordingly, the venue
motion was set for hearing on May 30, 2003. On April 11, 2003, the day
of the summary judgment hearing, the defendant filed a motion for con-
tinuance, arguing that the trial court needed to rule on the motion to
transfer venue before addressing the summary judgment motion. The de-
fendant requested that the summary judgment hearing be reset to the
same time as the motion to transfer venue. Significantly, the defendant
never asked for a hearing on its motion for continuance and never ob-
tained a ruling on that motion from the trial court.
The trial court held the hearing on the motion for summary judgment
as scheduled on April 11, 2003.82 The defendant did not appear at the
hearing, and the trial court granted judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal,
the Dallas Court of Appeals determined that the defendant waived its
motion to transfer venue by failing to obtain a written order on its motion
to continue the summary judgment hearing and by failing to seek leave of
court to have the venue motion heard earlier by requesting that the forty-
five-day notice be shortened.
83
V. PARTIES
Whether the misidentification of parties tolls limitations was a hot topic
during the Survey period. In Brinker Texas L.P. v. Looney, the Fort
76. Id. at 407.
77. Id. at 407-08.
78. Id. at 408.
79. Id.
80. Bench Co. v. Nations Rent of Tex., L.P., 133 S.W.3d 907 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004,
no pet. h.).
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 87.




Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the differences between "misidentifica-
tion" and "misnomer" cases and how those differences impact the limita-
tions analysis. 84 Here, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action
against Brinker Chili's Texas, Inc. ("BCTI") doing business as Chili's
Hamburger Grill & Bar, also known as Chili's Grill & Bar, prior to the
expiration of the limitations period. BCTI filed an answer but waited six
months until after limitations had run to amend its answer to deny that it
was sued in the proper capacity or that it did business as Chili's
Hamburger Grill & Bar, also known as Chili's Grill & Bar.8 5 BCTI as-
serted that the proper party to the suit was Brinker Texas, L.P.
("BTLP"), which owned and operated the location where the injury oc-
curred. BCTI was the general partner of BTLP. The plaintiff then
amended her petition to assert that she was suing BCTI in its capacity as
general partner of BTLP and also to name BTLP, the limited partnership,
as a defendant. During trial, BTLP moved for directed verdict, arguing
that the plaintiff's claims against it were barred by limitations. The trial
court denied the motion, and BTLP appealed.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals first clarified the distinctions be-
tween "misnomer" and "misidentification" cases. "A misnomer occurs
when the plaintiff misnames [the correct defendant,] but the correct
part[y is] actually served."' 86 In misnomer cases, an amended petition
correcting the name of the defendant relates back to the date of the origi-
nal petition.87 A misidentification case, on the other hand, "occurs when
two separate but related legal entities use similar names and the plaintiff
sues the wrong one because [he] is mistaken about which entity is the
correct defendant." 88 In misidentification cases, the amended petition re-
lates back to the date of the original petition only if the proper defendant
had "notice of the suit and was not misled or disadvantaged by the mis-
take."'89 "The plaintiff's diligence is not a determining factor in misiden-
tification cases because the plaintiff has brought suit within the
limitations period, but has named the wrong party." 90 Rather, the em-
phasis is solely on the equitable application of the statute-of-limitation
rules. 91
In this case, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals concluded that the plain-
tiff's claims were not barred by limitations. With respect to the plaintiff's
claim against BCTI, the court held that "the portion of [the plaintiff's]
amended petition clarifying that BCTI was being sued in its capacity as
84. Brinker Tex. L.P. v. Looney, 135 S.W.3d 280 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.
h.).
85. Id. at 284.
86. Id. at 284-85.
87. Id. at 285.
88. Id.
89. Id. During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed this general
rule regarding the tolling of statute of limitations in misidentification cases. See Flour
Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Bass, 133 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex. 2004).




[the] general partner ... relates back to [the] original petition. '92 With
respect to the plaintiff's claims directly against BTLP, the court found
that the claims were not time-barred because BTLP's general partner,
BCTI, was properly and timely served before limitations ran, and notice
of the suit and the underlying facts could be imputed to BTLC.
93
In Riston v. John Doe, a case of first impression, the Fourteenth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals held that a "John Doe" petition would not toll
limitations unless specifically authorized by statute. 94 On or about Sep-
tember 23, 2000, the plaintiff was allegedly injured when she was struck
by an elevator door at Houston Intercontinental Airport. Although
plaintiff originally sued only the City of Houston, she filed an amended
petition on September 22, 2002 against various John Doe defendants who
designed, manufactured, sold, installed, built, and/or maintained the ele-
vator. On September 25, 2002, the plaintiff filed a second amended peti-
tion naming "John Doe No. 1 a/k/a Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corporation
d/b/a Thyssenkrupp Elevator d/b/a Dover Elevator d/b/a Dover Elevator
Company d/b/a Dover" in place of John Doe No. 1. Thyssenkrupp was
served on October 25, 2002 and subsequently moved for summary judg-
ment, asserting that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the two-year
statute of limitations. The trial court granted Thyssenkrupp's motion for
summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the statute of
limitations was tolled based on the "doctrines of misnomer, due diligence,
and relation back." 95
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals first held that the "misno-
mer" doctrine was not applicable and, therefore, did not toll limitations.
96
Specifically, "the court noted that 'John Doe' is not a misnomer for any
person or entity."'97 Rather, "John Doe" is a fictitious name used in legal
proceedings to designate a person whose identity is unknown.98 Thus, the
plaintiff's naming of "John Doe" as a defendant instead of Thyssenkrupp
was not a mistake, making the plaintiff's tolling arguments under the mis-
nomer doctrine inapposite. 99
The court also refused to hold that a John Doe petition tolls limitations
as to an unknown defendant. First, the court noted that there was no
specific statute generally authorizing a plaintiff to initiate a suit and toll
limitations by suing an unknown defendant as "John Doe" or any other
fictitious name.10 0 Because the legislature has, under certain circum-
stances, allowed John Doe petitions to toll limitations with respect to cer-
tain causes of action, the court refused to infer that the legislature
92. Id. at 286.
93. Id.
94. Riston v. John Doe, No. 14-03-00869-CV, 2004 WL 1661030, at *2 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] July 27, 2004, pet. denied).
95. Id. at *1.







intended to create such a blanket tolling doctrine.101 Second, the court
concluded that public policy supported the conclusion that a John Doe
petition does not toll limitations.10 2 In particular, the court noted that
statutes of limitations would have little, if any, import if they could be so
easily circumvented merely by filing a "John Doe" petition. 103
VI. CLASS ACTIONS
In Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray,10 4 the Texas Supreme Court
held that trial courts considering certification under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 42(b)(2) must consider whether class members are entitled to
individual notice and opt out rights when the class representative seeks
monetary damages under any theory.105 Here, the trial court certified a
nationwide class under both Rule 42(b)(2) and (b)(3).10 6 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's certification of a Rule 42(b)(2) class,
holding that declaratory relief was appropriate. 10 7 The court of appeals
then concluded that, because the trial court properly certified the class
under Rule 42(b)(2), "it is unnecessary to address ... the [Rule 42(b)(3)]
requirements of predominance and superiority. '1 0 8
The Texas Supreme Court first found that it had jurisdiction to consider
the interlocutory appeal, because the effect of the court of appeals's deci-
sion was to affirm the Rule 42(b)(3) class without reviewing the predomi-
nance and superiority requirements.10 9 Turning to the merits of the
101. Id. (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §16.0045 (Vernon 2002)).
102. Id. at *3.
103. Id.
104. 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004).
105. Id. at 668. Rule 42(b)(2) provides the following:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition .. .the party opposing the class has
acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(2).
106. Rule 42(b)(3) provides the following:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition ... the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters perti-
nent to these issues include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prose-
cution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready commenced by or against members of the class;
C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the
claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3).
107. Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 670.




certification order under Rule 42(b)(2), the supreme court noted that the
plaintiff argued that certification was proper because the class plaintiffs
had disclaimed consequential damages and primarily sought a declaration
that the floppy disc controllers were defective and, therefore, Compaq
breached its limited warranty. Compaq countered that the declaratory
judgment claim regarding a breach of warranty was merely a predicate to
a claim for damages and an attempt by plaintiff's counsel to "shoe horn"
a damage claim into a Rule 42(b)(2) class claim for declaratory relief.
In its analysis, the Texas Supreme Court noted that the procedural dis-
tinctions between Rule 42(b)(2) and (b)(3) class actions are significant.
In particular, Rule 42(b)(3) provides that class members are entitled to
individual notice and an opportunity to opt out, while Rule 42(b)(2) con-
tains no such requirements.' 10 According to the Texas Supreme Court,
both plaintiffs and defendants might be motivated to avoid the more rig-
orous Rule 42(b)(3) requirements. By way of example, plaintiff's counsel
might be motivated to seek damages under the Rule 42(b)(2) framework
because class members are deprived of notice and opt out protections,
thus allowing plaintiff's counsel to gather thousands of clients by certifi-
cation. 1 Defendants, on the other hand, might prefer Rule 42(b)(2) cer-
tification because of the possible res judicata effect on subsequent
claims. 112
The Texas Supreme Court noted that Rule 42 was silent on whether
damages could be recovered in Rule 42(b)(2) class claims and, therefore,
analyzed the applicable federal law governing class actions. 13 The su-
preme court concluded that due process concerns require trial courts ad-
dressing a request for certification under Rule 42(b)(2) to consider
whether class members are entitled to individual notice and opt out rights
whenever a class action seeks monetary damages under any theory.
1 1 4
While the supreme court did not expressly hold that there could be no
such class certified absent notice and opt out rights to class members, it
did state that "if damage claims are implicated, constitutional considera-
tions will likely mandate such protections."
1 5
VII. PLEADINGS
In Bailey v. Hutchins,116 the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered
whether the "mailbox rule" applied to a lawsuit mailed immediately
before the effective date of a statute but received after such date. 117 In




114. Id. at 667.
115. Id. at 668.
116. 140 S.W.3d 448 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).
117. The mailbox rule provides as follows: "If any document is sent to the proper clerk
by first-class United States mail .. . on or before the last day for filing same, the same, if
received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be
deemed filed in time." TEX. R. Civ. P. 5.
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this medical-malpractice action, the plaintiff's original petition was
mailed, via United States first-class mail, to the district clerk on August
29, 2003 and was received by the district clerk on September 2, 2003. At
the time the pleading was deposited in the mail, the statute obligated the
plaintiff to serve her expert report on each party within 180 days of the
date the suit was filed. 118 However, at the time the petition was actually
received by the clerk, a new statutory provision had become effective that
reduced the 180-day period to 120 days.1 19 The plaintiff filed her expert
report on February 26, 2004, which was within 180 days but more than
120 days later. Accordingly, the defendant moved to dismiss the suit on
the ground that the report was tardy.'20 The trial court denied the mo-
tion, and the defendant appealed.121
The defendant argued that the trial court's interpretation of the
mailbox rule resulted in an amendment to the terms of the statute by
delaying the implementation of the legislature's decree that the statutory
amendment take effect on September 1, 2003.122 The Amarillo Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, noting that while the statute addressed
the time for "filing," it was silent on when a claim should be "deemed"
filed.123 The defendant also argued that Rule 5 contemplates the exis-
tence of a filing deadline, and that because the statute in question con-
tained no such deadline, the mailbox rule was inapplicable. The court of
appeals was not persuaded, holding that the plaintiff sought to avail her-
self of the greater relief provided under the old statute and had to act
before a specific date to obtain that relief.12 4 Accordingly, the effective
date of the statute had, in fact, created a filing deadline for the plaintiff.
In Williams v. Schneiber, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the
mailbox rule was properly invoked if the clerk timely received a copy of
the relevant pleading, even if it was not the one mailed. 125 Here, the
plaintiff mailed her appeal bond on August 22, 2002 and faxed a copy of
the appeal bond on August 27, 2002, which was within the prescribed time
period. Although the clerk did not receive the appeal bond that was
placed in the mail, the faxed copy was received. Under these circum-
stances, the court of appeals held that the appeal was timely perfected.' 26
In Graham v. Adesa Texas, Inc., the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of pleading amendments. In their original petition, plaintiffs
118. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i 13.01(d) (Vernon Supp. 2003), repealed by
Acts 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09.
119. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).
120. Bailey, 140 S.W.3d at 450.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 451.
123. Id. at 452.
124. Id.
125. Williams v. Schneiber, 148 S.W.3d 581, 585-86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no
pet. h.).
126. Id.; see Stokes v. Aberdeen Ins. Co., 917 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. 1996) (holding that
a requirement that the clerk must receive the same piece of paper actually mailed was
reading the rules too restrictively).
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asserted that defendants committed negligence and gross negligence but
sought only exemplary damages, stating that both defendants were "co-
employers" and thus were shielded from liability for compensatory dam-
ages under the Texas Worker's Compensation Act.127 Immediately prior
to the original trial setting, plaintiffs attempted to file an amended peti-
tion that sought, in the alternative, actual damages if defendants were
unsuccessful in showing that they were shielded under the worker's com-
pensation statute. The defendants objected, and the trial court struck the
amended petition.128 Because the original trial setting had passed, how-
ever, the trial court stated that "its ruling was without prejudice to plain-
tiffs seeking to file an amended petition in the future. '129 Accordingly,
the plaintiffs filed a second motion for leave to file an amended petition,
asserting that because the original trial setting passed and no new trial
date was set, plaintiffs should be allowed to amend their petition. Plain-
tiffs did not request a hearing on the motion for leave, however, and de-
fendants did not file a response.
The trial court ultimately granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment and denied all other relief.130 "Accordingly, the trial court's
order encompassed a denial of the [plaintiffs'] pending motion for leave
to file an amended petition.' 31 On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the
trial court erred in denying their motion for leave to file an amended
petition. 132 The Dallas Court of Appeals agreed, finding that the trial
court abused its discretion in refusing the amendment because (1) de-
fendants did not present any evidence of surprise or prejudice, and (2)
the amendment did not assert a new cause of action or defense and,
therefore, was not prejudicial on its face.133
VIII. DISCOVERY
The Texas Supreme Court addressed a number of discovery issues dur-
ing the Survey period. In In re Kuntz,134 the supreme court was called on
to interpret whether documents were within a party's "possession, cus-
tody, or control" within the meaning of Rule 192.7(b). 135 The trial court
ordered the husband in this family law dispute to produce documents to
which he had access at his place of employment. 136 It was undisputed,
however, that the documents were in the physical possession of his em-
ployer, that the documents were owned by the employer's client, and that
the client claimed the documents were trade secrets. The supreme court







133. Id. (citing Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990)).
134. 124 S.W.3d 179 (Tex. 2003).
135. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.7(b).
136. Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d at 183.
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held that the husband's mere access to the documents did not constitute
possession of the documents, and the trial court abused its discretion in
ordering him to produce them.137
In re Dana Corp. presented the question whether a party is entitled to
discovery of insurance information beyond the existence and terms of any
potentially applicable policy. 138 The plaintiffs argued that they needed
information about the extent to which any such policy had been
eroded.139 The Texas Supreme Court held that while Rule 192.3(f)14 0
does not foreclose the possibility of discovery of other insurance informa-
tion, it likewise does not provide a basis for a trial court to order discov-
ery beyond production of the policy itself.' 4 ' Instead, the supreme court
concluded "a party may discover information beyond an insurance agree-
ment's existence and contents only if the information is otherwise discov-
erable under our scope-of-discovery rule.' 42 Thus, the supreme court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the underlying purpose of Rule
192.3(f), namely to facilitate settlement negotiations, provided a sufficient
basis to allow discovery about the extent of the remaining coverage under
a policy. 14 3
The issue in Cire v. Cummings was whether a trial court may ever
strike a plaintiff's pleadings as a sanction without first testing the effec-
tiveness of lesser sanctions. 144 The trial court in this legal malpractice
case found that the plaintiff violated its prior orders by deliberately de-
stroying tape recordings of conversations with the defendant-attorneys in
order to avoid producing them. Based on this finding, the court pre-
sumed that her actions prevented the defendants from obtaining objec-
tive proof that they were not liable.' 45 Although the only prior discovery
sanction was a $250 sanction against the plaintiff's counsel (which had not
been paid), the trial court struck plaintiff's pleadings, finding that less
severe sanctions would be ineffective and would not cure the prejudice to
the defendant. 146 The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial
court abused its discretion by failing to consider alternative lesser sanc-
tions, including the possibility of a spoliation instruction.' 47
137. Id. at 184. The supreme court's opinion also notes that, if required to produce the
documents, the husband would have violated confidentiality agreements and potentially
subjected himself to a significant damage claim. Id. In a concurring opinion joined by
three other justices, Justice Hecht found similar fault with the trial court's order, stating
that the trial judge found that the documents were privileged trade secrets of the em-
ployer's clients, but nevertheless ordering them produced without the required showing
that they were necessary to a fair adjudication of the case. Id. at 185 (Hecht, J.,
concurring).
138. In re Dana Corp., 138 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. 2004).
139. Id. at 302.
140. TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.3(f).
141. Dana, 138 S.W.3d at 302.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 304.
144. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2004).
145. Id. at 837-38.




The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated
the trial court's take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff. 148 The su-
preme court surveyed its own prior opinions on so-called "death penalty"
sanctions, focusing on whether they required a trial court to only "con-
sider" less severe sanctions before ordering death penalty sanctions or
whether instead lesser sanctions must actually be "tested" first.149 The
supreme court concluded that its prior decisions stood for the proposition
that a trial court must "consider the availability of less stringent sanc-
tions, and in all but the most exceptional cases, [must] actually test such
lesser sanctions before striking [a party's] pleadings. ' 150 Based on the
"egregious conduct and blatant disregard for the discovery process
demonstrated" by the plaintiff, however, the supreme court held that this
was such an "exceptional case" where "no lesser sanctions would pro-
mote compliance with the discovery rules, and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in striking the [plaintiff's] pleadings."'1 51
Rule 215.4(b) 152 provides that a party is entitled to recover the reason-
able expenses incurred in adducing proof of a fact that the opposing party
has refused, without reasonable justification, to admit in response to a
request for admission.1 53 In Peralta v. Durham, the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals applied this rule to uphold an award of expenses to the plaintiff in a
car accident case.154 The plaintiff served various requests for admissions
asking the defendant to admit she had been negligent in several specific
ways; the defendant denied all of them.1 55 Immediately before trial, how-
ever, the defendant stipulated to liability, and the case was tried on dam-
ages alone.156 In affirming the trial court's award of expenses for her
failure to admit, the court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument
that the requests for admission were improper and that she was entitled
to rely on her general denial and make the plaintiff prove his case.157 The
defendant did not object to the requests for admission, and the court dis-
agreed with her characterization of the requests as improper.' 58 The
court also dismissed plaintiff's argument that the requisites of Rule
215.4(b) 159 were not established, because her eleventh-hour stipulation to
liability relieved the plaintiff of the obligation to prove her negligence at
148. Id. at 836-37.
149. Id. at 839-41.
150. Id. at 841.
151. Id. at 842. The supreme court noted that the trial court could have chosen instead
to give the jury a spoliation instruction, but the defendant would then "still have [had] to
prepare for and attend a trial, despite a justified presumption that" the plaintiff's claims
lacked merit. Id. at 843. Given this, as well as the extreme nature of the misconduct, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in foregoing the spoliation instruction in favor of an
order striking plaintiff's pleadings. Id.
152. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.4(b).
153. Id.
154. Peralta v. Durham, 133 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
155. Id. at 341-42.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 341.
158. Id.
159. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.4(b).
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trial.160 The court concluded that the defendant's reading of the rule was
too narrow and "would defeat the purpose of the rule. 161
One of the least-discussed aspects of requests for disclosure-the re-
quest for the identity of potential parties-took center stage in In re
Morse.162 The relators in this mandamus action complained of the trial
court's refusal to compel the defendants to disclose the identities of their
present and former shareholders whom relators contended were potential
parties on relators' fraudulent transfer claims. 163 Relying on Rule 194164
and the limited case law interpreting it, the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that the relators "were entitled to disclosure of the names and ad-
dresses of the shareholders" as potential parties, and the trial court there-
fore abused its discretion in denying their motion to compel.' 65
Texas courts also addressed several privilege questions during the Sur-
vey period. In In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., the Texas Supreme
Court reviewed the sufficiency of DuPont's privilege log in an asbestos
case brought by nearly 400 plaintiffs against DuPont and over 100 other
defendants.1 66 After the plaintiffs requested a hearing on DuPont's privi-
lege claims for all of the 607 documents in the privilege log, DuPont filed
an affidavit of its paralegal in support of the privilege assertion and ten-
dered the documents for in camera inspection. 167 The plaintiffs argued
that the paralegal's affidavit lacked specificity because it addressed
groups of documents rather than each document individually, and that it
was not probative because it was not based on the affiant's personal
knowledge. 168 The supreme court rejected both arguments. 69 Regard-
ing the claimed lack of specificity, the supreme court noted that while the
paralegal did not attest to the contents of each of the documents at issue,
his affidavit did establish the factual basis for the application of "the at-
torney-client and/or work product privileges to the documents" by cate-
gory and did not merely present global assertions that all of the
documents came within those privileges.' 70 Likewise, the supreme court
held that the paralegal's explanation that his statements regarding the
predicate facts establishing the privileges were based on his review of the
human-resource database for DuPont's legal department satisfied the
160. Peralta, 133 S.W.3d at 341-42.
161. Id. at 342.
162. 153 S.W.3d 578 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).
163. Id. at 580.
164. TEX. R. Civ. P. 194.
165. Morse, 153 S.W.3d at 582.
166. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. 2004). As the
court explained, a "'privilege log' is the commonly used term" for a party's identification
of the documents it has withheld in discovery on the basis of privilege, which listing is
required upon request pursuant to TEx. R. Civ. P. 193.3(b). DuPont, 136 S.W.3d at 221
n.1.
167. Id. at 222.
168. Id. at 223-24.




personal knowledge requirement. 71 Significantly, the supreme court's
guidance on these two points should greatly assist practitioners called
upon to support a corporate litigant's claim of privilege, particularly when
the documents at issue span many years in the corporation's history.
Rule 193.3(d) 172 provides that the inadvertent production of a privi-
leged document does not waive the privilege, unless the producing party
fails to assert the privilege and seek to reclaim the document within ten
days after it actually discovers the inadvertent production. Warrantech
Corp. v. Computer Adapters Services, Inc. explored the proper applica-
tion of this rule where the document in question, a letter from a client to
her attorney, was listed on the adverse parties' trial exhibit list a month
before trial.173 The letter was attached to a series of invoices and de-
scribed on the exhibit list only as "Invoice with attachments," as were
hundreds of other exhibits. 174 Accordingly, it was not until the privileged
letter was actually offered at trial that the producing parties asserted the
attorney-client privilege.1 75 Under these circumstances, the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that the privilege had not been waived.176
Whether a plaintiff church can be compelled, consistently with the First
Amendment, to produce church membership, tithing, and other financial
records was at issue in In re CFWC Religious Ministries, Inc. The defen-
dant argued that the "offensive use" doctrine waived any constitutional
privilege the church could otherwise assert, because the church sought
affirmative relief and the information sought was relevant to the church's
alleged economic damages. 77 Although the Beaumont Court of Appeals
agreed that the offensive use doctrine would apply if the church intended
to prove actual damagesby showing a reduction in membership, attend-
ance, or revenue, the record did not clearly demonstrate that this was in
fact the basis of the church's damage claim. 178 While the court was ap-
parently sympathetic to the defendant's and the trial judge's frustration at
being unable to get the church to make clear the basis for any economic
damages claimed, the defendant simply had not exhausted all other dis-
covery methods by which he could secure that information, which was
required before any offensive use waiver could be found. 179
171. Id.
172. TEx R. Civ. P. 193.3(d).
173. Warrantech Corp. v. Computer Adapters Servs., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The court of appeals also rejected the opposing parties' arguments that the
letter was not privileged under the crime-fraud exception, or that any privilege had been
waived by the offensive use doctrine. Id. at 526-28.
177. In re CFWC Religious Ministries, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 891, 892 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2004, no pet. h.).
178. Id. at 894.
179. Id. at 894-95.
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Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima International, Inc. addressed
whether an expert witness who switches sides in a lawsuit should be dis-
qualified from testifying.180 Finding that the issue was one of first impres-
sion in Texas, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals relied on federal case
law to adopt a two-part test: "(1) was it objectively reasonable for the
first party who claims to have retained the expert to conclude that a con-
fidential relationship existed between that party and the expert; and (2)
did the first party disclose any confidential or privileged information to
the expert?" 181 The court held that the party seeking disqualification in
this case carried its burden of proving both elements of this test and that
the expert should have been disqualified. 182 In addition, because the ex-
pert's testimony was critical to the adverse party's case, the court held
that the judgment in the latter's favor should be reversed and the case
remanded for a new trial.183
Finally, Branum v. Northwest Texas Healthcare System, Inc. addressed
the interplay between a level-3 discovery control plan 184 and a no-evi-
dence motion for summary judgment. 185 In this medical-malpractice
case, the plaintiff timely filed an expert report after filing suit, as required
by the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.186 Having
originally alleged that she intended to conduct discovery under level 2,
the plaintiff failed to designate any testifying experts by the deadline for
doing so under level 2.187 When the defendants filed a no-evidence sum-
mary judgment motion, plaintiff responded with a motion to adopt a
level-3 discovery control plan to postpone the summary judgment hearing
and in the alternative, permission to late-designate experts under level
2.188 Following a six-month stay that intervened for unrelated reasons,
the trial court held a hearing and granted summary judgment for the
defendants. 189
On appeal, the plaintiff complained that "the trial court erred in grant-
ing summary judgment before granting her motion" to adopt a level 3
discovery control plan and establishing new expert designation deadlines
thereunder. 190 Contending that the trial court was required to convert
discovery to level 3 upon her request, the plaintiff argued that there was
180. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., No. 13-02-385-CV, 2004 WL
2534207, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Nov. 10, 2004, no pet. h.).
181. Id. at *2.
182. Id. at *7.
183. Id. at *6.
184. Branum v. N.W. Tex. Healthcare Sys., Inc. 134 S.W.3d 340, 342 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2004, pet. denied).
185. Rule 190.1 requires that every case be governed by a level 1, 2, or 3 discovery
control plan. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.1. A level 2 discovery control plan is the default plan
that governs the majority of civil cases. However, a level 3 plan must be entered by the
trial court on the motion of any party. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 190.4.
186. Branum, 134 S.W.3d at 341.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 341-42.
190. Id. at 342.
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not an "adequate time for discovery" as required under Rule 166a(i) 191
before the no-evidence motion was granted. 192 The Amarillo Court of
Appeals disagreed, noting that it did not need to decide whether the trial
court was required to convert discovery to level 3 because the question
whether there has been an "adequate time for discovery" is case-specific
in any event. 193 The plaintiff did not contend that she lacked adequate
time for discovery, and the court declined to impose any bright-line rule
tied to the discovery deadline under level 2 or 3.194 Moreover, the plain-
tiff did not file a sworn motion for continuance of the summary judgment
hearing as required by Rule 252,195 nor did she file any affidavit describ-
ing her reasons for additional time for discovery as required by Rule
166a(g). 196
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Texas Supreme Court held in Binur v. Jacobo that parties may
combine traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motions in a sin-
gle filing. 197 The supreme court further held that attaching evidence to
such a motion for purposes of the traditional motion does not foreclose
the movant from also advancing no-evidence points under Rule 166a(i) 198
within the same instrument. 199 The supreme court noted that while the
use of headings to delineate clearly between the traditional and no-evi-
dence grounds in the motion "would be helpful to [both] the bench and
bar," it is not required under Rule 166a. 200
In Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture the Texas Supreme Court held
that the trial court did not err in denying the plaintiff's motion for contin-
uance of a summary judgment hearing that was filed only two months
after suit had been initiated because the sole issue to be decided on sum-
mary judgment was official immunity.201 Because none of the discovery
requested in the continuance would have raised a fact question on that
point, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continu-
ance and proceeding with the summary judgment hearing soon after suit
had been filed.202 Conversely, in Nelson v. PNC Mortgage Corp., the trial
court did abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for continu-
191. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
192. Branum, 134 S.W.3d at 343.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. TEX. R. Civ. P. 252.
196. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(g); Branum, 134 S.W.3d at 343.
197. Binur v. Jacobo, 135 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex. 2004).
198. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
199. Binur, 135 S.W.3d at 650-51.
200. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a; Binur, 135 S.W.3d at 651. But see Martinez v. Wilson Plaza
Assocs., L.P., No. 13-02-697-CV, 2004 WL 2471785 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 4,
2004, no pet. h.) (holding that the trial court erred in impliedly overruling special excep-
tions to a summary judgment motion where the non-movant could not determine whether
such a motion was based upon traditional or no-evidence grounds).
201. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161-62 (Tex. 2004).
202. Id. at 162.
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ance and ruling on the defendants' summary judgment motion, where the
plaintiff had filed various discovery motions that the trial court had not
ruled upon, and the discovery sought bore directly upon the merits of the
case and the pending summary judgment motion.20 3
Several courts addressed the issue of the notice required for summary
judgment hearings during the Survey period. In Lester v. Capital Indus-
tries, Inc. the San Antonio Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
default summary judgment, holding that once the defendant's attorney
made an appearance in the case, all communications from opposing coun-
sel in the suit should have been sent to him.20 4 Because notice of the
summary judgment hearing was not given to defendant's counsel, the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment.205 Likewise, in Tanksley v.
CitiCapital Commercial Corp.,206 the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a
summary judgment where the record did not contain adequate evidence
that the non-movant was properly served with the summary judgment
motion or advised of the hearing.20 7 Because the certificate of service
referred only to service by certified mail, which all parties acknowledged
was returned undelivered, the court did not consider the plaintiffs' coun-
sel's statements that the motion was also sent by regular mail.20 8 On the
other hand, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held in Winn v. Martin
Homebuilders, Inc. that while a party is entitled to twenty-one days notice
of a summary judgment hearing, no similar notice is required for a subse-
quent hearing on that same motion.
20 9
The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed in Cimarron Hydrocarbons
Corp. v. Carpenter the issue of preservation of error where the non-mo-
vant failed to timely respond to a summary judgment motion that in-
cluded no-evidence grounds.210 Arguing that it had alleged direct tort
claims against the defendant-movant and not a claim based on piercing
the corporate veil, the plaintiff noted that the defendant's motion failed
to identify the elements of those claims that lacked evidentiary sup-
port.21' The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's failure to
file a response did not waive this complaint regarding the legal sufficiency
of the no-evidence summary judgment motion.212
203. Nelson v. PNC Mortgage Corp., 139 S.W.3d 442, 445-46 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004,
no pet. h.).
204. Lester v. Capital Indus., Inc., 153 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no
pet. h.).
205. Id.
206. 145 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
207. Id. at 764-65.
208. Id. at 764.
209. Winn v. Martin Homebuilders, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 553, 556-57 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2004, pet. denied).
210. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp. v. Carpenter, 143 S.W.3d 560, 561-62 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
211. Id. at 562.




The Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed the issue of equalization
of peremptory strikes in In re Interest of M.N.G.2 13 The court affirmed
the termination of a mother's parental rights, even though counsel for the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) and the at-
torney ad litem for the minor child coordinated their peremptory strikes
over the mother's objection at trial.2 14 The court rejected the argument
that the mother waived her complaint by failing to timely object, noting
that counsel for the ad litem had represented prior to voir dire that he
would not exercise any strikes and would leave the jury selection up to
counsel for DFPS but then did not do so.2 15 However, because the record
showed that underlying facts in the suit were largely not in dispute, and
there was no other indication of prejudice, the court concluded that any
error was not harmful.2 16
In Wells v. Barrow, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the clerk's
inadvertent failure to seat a panel member on the jury who was not struck
did not constitute reversible error, because the final juror who was in-
cluded as a result was not otherwise disqualified. 2 17 The court reasoned
that a party's "right to have the jury selected in substantial compliance
with the applicable procedural statutes and rules" does not equate to the
right to select who would actually sit on the jury. 21 8 Rather, one's right to
a jury trial is simply the "right to have fact questions resolved by an im-
partial jury. '219
XI. JURY CHARGE
The Texas Supreme Court in Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline
Co. addressed the submission of competing breach of contract claims in a
jury charge.2 20 Noting that a prior material breach excuses further per-
formance by the other party, the supreme court held that it is appropriate
to submit the jury question disjunctively (i.e., did Mustang or Driver fail
to comply with the terms of their agreement), coupled with an "instruc-
tion directing the jury to decide who committed the first material
breach." 22 1
Texas courts continue to grapple with broad-form submission where
valid and invalid theories of liability are presented. In Laredo Medical
Group Corp. v. Mireles, the jury received a broad-form submission that
inquired into the liability of two defendants under several different theo-
213. 147 S.W.3d 521, 530 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
214. Id. at 532.
215. Id. at 532-33. The proper time to object, according to the court, was after voir dire
and prior to the exercise of peremptory challenges. Id. at 532.
216. Id. at 533-34.
217. Wells v. Barrow, 153 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, no pet. h.).
218. Id. at 516.
219. Id. at 517.
220. Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. 2004).
221. Id. at 196-200.
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ries, some of which were "not supported by legally sufficient evi-
dence. '22 2 Because the appellants timely and specifically objected to this
submission, it was necessary to reverse and remand the jury's verdict in
favor of the plaintiff.223 Similarly, in Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Co.
v. James, the trial court conditioned certain questions regarding mental
anguish damages upon the jury's answer to several underlying liability
theories, including a claim for breach of contract. 224 Because "mental
anguish damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract claim and
the Dallas Court of Appeals could not conclude that the jury did not
consider breach of contract as a basis for awarding mental anguish dam-
ages, it reversed and remanded the case.225 In Urista v. Bed, Bath & Be-
yond, Inc., a personal injury action, the trial court submitted a negligence
question to the jury with an instruction regarding "unavoidable accident"
that was not supported by the evidence. 226 The First District Court of
Appeals held that this was reversible error.227 The dissent chastised the
majority, however, for abandoning a traditional harmful-error analysis in
favor of the presumed-harm analysis under Crown Life Insurance Co. v.
Casteel.2 28
In Tesfa v. Stewart the court held that where the defendants submitted
no-evidence objections to each subsection of a damage question, they
failed to preserve error because they did not plainly inform the trial court
of the specific element of damages of which they were complaining.
229
The court in Coley v. Baylor University reversed and remanded an action
where the court's charge failed to include a requested question and in-
struction on the issue of constructive discharge. 230 The court reasoned
that the plaintiff complied with Rule 278231 by tendering the proposed
question and instruction to the court coordinator at the beginning of the
trial and then, after the trial court failed to include them in its proposed
charge, reading the question and instruction into the record during the
charge conference and requesting that they be submitted.
232
222. Laredo Med. Group Corp. v. Mireles, 155 S.W.3d 417, 427 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2004, pet. filed).
223. Id. at 425-27.
224. Royal Maccabees Life Ins. Co. v. James, 146 S.W.3d 340, 351 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2004, no pet. h.).
225. Id.
226. Urista v. Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 517, 523 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2004, pet. filed).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 525-26 (Jennings, J., dissenting) (citing Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22
S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000)).
229. Tesfa v. Stewart, 135 S.W.3d 272, 275-76 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet.
denied).
230. Coley v. Baylor Univ., 147 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. filed).
231. TEX. R. Civ. P. 278.




In Gold v. Gold, the Texas Supreme Court held that failing to file a
restricted appeal does not bar a party from pursuing a bill of a review,
particularly where all the elements of a restricted appeal cannot be
met.233 In this case, the appellant could have timely filed a restricted
appeal but could not have shown error apparent on the face of the record
as is required under that procedure. 234 Thus, the supreme court held that
a restricted appeal was not available to appellant, and the failure to pur-
sue that avenue did not bar the appellant's bill of review. 235 Moreover,
the supreme court held that even if a restricted appeal would have been
viable, the appellant still would have been entitled to file a bill of review
instead. 236 The supreme court noted that foregoing a restricted appeal
might be to a party's advantage and would not, therefore, necessarily con-
stitute the fault or negligence that would preclude a bill of review. 237 Al-
though a bill of review is available "only if a party has exercised due
diligence in pursuing" its legal remedies, the supreme court noted that it
had never held that a restricted appeal was an adequate legal remedy that
a bill of review claimant must pursue.
23 8
The Texas Supreme Court in M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape clarified that a
summary judgment order is still final and appealable when it disposes of
all issues and all parties that are before the court, even if one of the
named defendants was never served and never entered an appearance.
2 39
Thus, even though the judgment was silent as to the unserved defendant,
it was still final.240 In Fresh Coat, Inc. v. Life Forms, Inc., the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals held that judgment was final and appealable, even
absent language in the judgment expressly stating it "is appealable,"
where the judgment clearly and finally disposed of all parties and
claims.24 1 The San Antonio Court of Appeals held in In re Vlasak that a
default judgment taken against a party over whom the trial court does not
have jurisdiction was final, even though it would be void if challenged. 242
In In re Helena Chemical Co., the trial court issued a letter stating that
because the parties were continuing to negotiate settlement, the Waco
Court of Appeals was withdrawing a previously-signed summary judg-
ment disposing of all issues.243 When the trial court entered a more lim-
ited interlocutory summary judgment several months later, the plaintiff
sought a writ of mandamus vacating the latter order on the ground that
233. Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 213 (Tex. 2004).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 214.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. M.O. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674-75 (Tex. 2004).
240. Id. at 675.
241. Fresh Coat, Inc. v. Life Forms, Inc., 125 S.W.3d 765, 767-68 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
242. In re Vlasak, 141 S.W.3d 233, 237-38 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
243. In re Helena Chem. Co., 134 S.W.3d 378, 379 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).
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the trial court's plenary power had expired.244 The Waco Court of Ap-
peals denied the writ of mandamus, holding that the trial court's language
in its letter and its subsequent actions indicated a present intent to with-
draw the summary judgment, and therefore the subsequent summary
judgment order was not void for lack of jurisdiction.245 In Perdue v. Pat-
ten Corp., on the other hand, the trial court sent a letter indicating that it
granted a motion for new trial and asking counsel to prepare an order
reflecting that ruling.246 The court filed the letter while it still had ple-
nary power, but the order granting the new trial was not filed until after
the trial court's plenary power expired.247 In holding the new trial order
void, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded that the letter itself was
legally insufficient to grant the motion for new trial because it contem-
plated that an order be signed afterwards.248
XIII. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES
The authority of the judge of a district court that encompasses multiple
counties was at issue in In re McGuire.249 The judge of the 278th District
Court, Kenneth H. Keeling, sitting for the judge of the 87th District
Court, entered a discovery sanction order against the relator while physi-
cally present in Walker County.250 While the two district courts shared
jurisdiction over one county, the 278th Judicial District also included
Walker County, but the 87th Judicial District did not.251 In concluding
that the sanction order was void, the Waco Court of Appeals held that
Judge Keeling had jurisdiction to hear and decide matters for the 87th
District Court only while physically present within any of the counties in
the 87th Judicial District.252
XIV. DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
The Texas Supreme Court upheld the disqualification of a law firm in
an asbestos lawsuit in In re Mitcham.253 The disqualification battle cen-
tered around a legal assistant, Gayle Mortola-Strasser, who was involved
with the representation of TXU in various asbestos cases and who later
became a lawyer and was hired by Waters & Kraus, L.L.P.254 As part of
244. Id.
245. Id. at 380.
246. Perdue v. Patten Corp., 142 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
247. Id. at 601.
248. Id. at 603.
249. 134 S.W.3d 406, 408 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet. h.).
250. Id. at 409.
251. Id. at 408 (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 24.189, 24.455 (Vernon 2004)).
252. Id. at 409-10. The Court rejected the real party in interest's argument that the
sanction order was saved by TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 74.094(e) (Vernon 2005), which
allows a judge to hear any pretrial matters in counties outside her jurisdiction if there is no
objection. McGuire, 134 S.W.2d at 409. According to the court, Chapter 74 of the Govern-
ment Code provides only for the assignment, docketing, and transfer of cases, not the ex-
change of benches between judges. Id.
253. 133 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Tex. 2004).
254. Id. at 275.
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an "Agreement Regarding Conflicts of Interest," Waters & Kraus agreed
that Mortola-Strasser would not share any information about TXU, and
that the firm would not handle asbestos cases against TXU.2 55 When
Mortola-Strasser subsequently left Waters & Kraus, however, the firm
filed an asbestos case against TXU. 256 The Waco Court of Appeals held
that there was an irrebuttable presumption that the "other attorneys at
Waters & Kraus had access to the confidences of TXU" that Mortola-
Strasser obtained while working as a legal assistant. Therefore, Waters &
Kraus was disqualified even though Mortola-Strasser no longer worked
for the firm.257
The Texas Supreme Court agreed that Waters & Kraus was disqualified
but based its decision solely on the "Agreement Regarding Conflicts of
Interest. '258 The supreme court declined to imply a reasonable time limit
on that agreement, which contained no express termination date.259 The
supreme court reasoned that, because the agreement also permanently
prohibited Mortola-Strasser from sharing TXU's confidential informa-
tion, which prohibition is permanent as to her, it could not imply a termi-
nation date that applied to only some of the agreement's provisions and
some of the parties.260 Thus, the supreme court did not reach the issue of
whether, in the absence of the agreement, Waters & Kraus would have
been disqualified from bringing asbestos claims against TXU after
Mortola-Strasser left.26 1
In re Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. teaches that a lawyer is not
necessarily disqualified from simultaneously representing one client in a
matter adverse to the interests of another client.262 In that case, a law
firm hired to defend a personal injury case for Star Shuttle was later hired
to represent Southwestern Bell in an unrelated breach of contract suit by
Star Shuttle and an affiliate.263 The trial court disqualified the firm, but
the San Antonio Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus re-
lief.264 Although noting that it is "not encouraged," the court of appeals
held that "concurrent representation of adverse clients is permitted in
Texas. ' 265 The court stated that the party moving for disqualification
must not only demonstrate that the lawyer's representation would rea-
sonably appear to be adversely limited by the representation of the other




257. In re TXU U.S. Holdings Co., 110 S.W.3d 62, 66-67 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no
pet.), mandamus denied, 133 S.W.3d 274, 277 (Tex. 2004).
258. Mitcham, 133 S.W.2d at 276-77.
259. Id. at 277.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. In re S.W. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 141 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, no pet.).
263. Id. at 230-31.
264. Id. at 232-33.
265. Id. at 231.
266. Id. at 232.
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Because the record in the trial court established, at most, only "potential
prejudice," the court of appeals held that disqualification was
inappropriate. 267
In In re Moore,2 68 the trial court disqualified an attorney from repre-
senting his client in a divorce proceeding based on the attorney having
asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege when he was called to testify
about certain financial dealings with the client that were at issue in the
divorce. 269 The court of appeals concluded that this was an abuse of dis-
cretion.2 70 The court noted that the determinative issue was not whether
the attorney invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, but whether the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that the attorney participated
with the client in a conspiracy to defraud the community estate.271 The
court found there was no evidence the attorney engaged in such conduct,
and it refused to allow the trial court to draw an inference of such wrong-
ful conduct based solely on the attorney's assertion of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege.272
Finally, two cases decided during the Survey period refused to allow
the disqualification of an attorney based on the adverse party's stated
desire to call the attorney as a witness. In In re Slusser,273 a trust dispute,
the trustee sought to disqualify the beneficiary's counsel, arguing that his
testimony was necessary to establish the beneficiary's motivation in filing
suit, which the trustee claimed was a relevant, controverted issue.274 The
court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that the test for disquali-
fication is not whether the attorney's testimony is relevant but whether it
is "necessary to 'establish an essential element on behalf of the [testify-
ing] lawyer's client."' 275 Similarly, in In re Chu,2 7 6 the appellate court
upheld the trial court's refusal to disqualify the attorney ad litem in a
custody proceeding, noting that the movant failed to demonstrate that the
ad litem's testimony was necessary to establish any essential fact on be-
half of his clients-that is, the children.277
XV. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
In In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America,278 the Texas Supreme
Court held that parties could contractually agree to waive a trial by jury
267. Id. at 232-33.
268. No. 12-03-00290-CV, 2004 WL 58368, at *3 (Tex. App.-Tyler March 24, 2004,
orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).
269. Id. at *3.
270. Id. at *7.
271. Id. at *5-6.
272. Id. at *6.
273. 136 S.W.3d 245, 247-48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, orig. proceeding).
274. Id. at 247-48.
275. Id. at 248 (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.08(a), reprinted in
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 2005)).
276. 134 S.W.3d 459 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, orig. proceeding).
277. Id. at 464-65.
278. 148 S.W.3d 124, 131 (Tex. 2004).
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in any future lawsuit.279 Primarily, the appellant argued that an agree-
ment to waive a trial by jury was contrary to the public policy expressed
in the Texas Constitution and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 216.280 The
supreme court disagreed, noting that the same "public policy that permits
parties to waive trials altogether," when, for example, they agree to arbi-
trate, "surely does not forbid a waiver of a jury."'281 However, the court
did recognize the potential for some parties "to take unfair advantage of
others, using bargaining position, sophistication, or other leverage to ex-
tract waivers from the reluctant or unwitting. '282 Accordingly, the su-
preme court emphasized that any "waiver of constitutional rights must be
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, with full awareness of the legal
consequences." 283
In Southwest Bank v. Information Support Concepts, Inc., the Texas
Supreme Court held that the proportional responsibility statute did not
apply to a conversion claim under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.284 In particular, the court held that applying the proportionate re-
sponsibility framework under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice &
Remedies Code "to claims involving Article 3 could . . . disrupt the
UCC's carefully allocated liability scheme. '285 Further, the supreme
court noted that the Texas Legislature adopted the revised Article 3 in
the same session in which it amended Chapter 33.286 Because there is a
tension between the two statutes, the court concluded it was "unreasona-
ble to assume that the Legislature intended to adopt the UCC's compre-
hensive liability scheme while simultaneously undoing that framework by
mandating the application of Chapter 33 to UCC-based conversion
claims. 287
In Forist v. Vanguard Underwriters Insurance Co.,288 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that the abuse of
discretion standard applies to a review of a trial court's determination
that a plaintiff is a "vexatious litigant. '289 As support for its conclusion,
the court of appeals noted that courts had "applied [the] abuse of discre-
tion standard for frivolous lawsuits under Texas Civil Practice & Reme-
dies Code § 13.001.290
279. Id. at 131.
280. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
281. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 131.
282. Id. at 132.
283. Id.
284. Southwest Bank v. Info. Support Concepts, Inc., 149 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. 2004).
285. Id. at 108.
286. Id. at 111.
287. Id. at 110; cf. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duefiez, No. 02-0381, 2004 WL
1966008, at *3 (Tex. Sept. 3, 2004) (applying Chapter 33's comparative responsibility provi-
sions to a claim under the Dram Shop Act).
288. 141 S.W.3d 668 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
289. Id. at 670; see TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.054(2) (Vernon 2002)
(setting forth the criteria for determining whether a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant).
290. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (Vernon 2002); Forist, 141 S.W.3d at
670.
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